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Abstract
The transformation of East-Central Europe deepens the debate about firm creation in a unique
way:  how do approaches to institutional creation impact the creation of firms?  This paper
theoretically and empirically explores this question by offering an alternative, embedded politics
approach to explain the sharp contrasts in policy and SME manufacturing growth in the Czech
Republic (CR) and Poland.  Whereas Polish policies of gradual privatization and state
intervention into restructuring led to significant growth in new firms, Czech policies of rapid,
mass privatization produced stagnation.  I argue that institutional experiments based on public
actors becoming financial partners and conflict mediators enhance the ability of network actors
to learn and monitor one another, and thus experiment with new forms of organization.  Poland
facilitated such institutional experiments not only in the ways it approached the creation of
market institutions, but also in the ways it decentralized power and resources to local and
regional political actors.  The study utilizes data on manufacturing networks, privatization,
bankruptcy, and regional government reforms collected over the past six years.4
Non-Technical Summary
The transformation of East-Central Europe deepens the debate about firm creation in a unique
way:  how do approaches to institutional creation impact the creation of firms?  This paper
theoretically and empirically explores this question by offering an alternative, embedded politics
approach to explain the sharp contrasts in policy and small and medium sized enterprise (SME)
manufacturing growth in the Czech Republic and Poland.
There are two dominant approaches to firm creation that have informed policies and our
understanding of institutional creation.  First, property rights and Kirznerian views of
entrepreneurship are reflected in reform approaches that understand transformation as
discontinuous change from communism to capitalism and advocate the rapid privatization and
liberalization of the economy.  The Czech Republic stood out among its neighbors in forming an
autonomous and coherent state apparatus that designed and implemented policies of rapid
liberalization and mass privatization.  In contrast, countries such as Poland became bogged down
in political infighting and delayed mass privatization until 1995-96.  However, Polish industrial
output and manufacturing SME manufacturing sector grew rapidly and extensively while Czech
output and manufacturing SMEs languished.
Second, the work on socio-economic networks argues that the reproduction of dense
manufacturing networks provides the optimal conditions for new firms to enter and innovation to
thrive.  Leading scholars to this work pointed to the Czech Republic as an optimal case for this to
occur.  However, not only did Czech manufacturing SMEs stagnate but also the highly touted
financial networks among banks and investment funds at best severely mismanaged assets.
My embedded politics approach builds on network theory but offers an alternative
understanding of firm and institutional creation that accounts for both continuity and change.
The conceptual point of departure from both approaches is that firms and entrepreneurial activity
are embedded in both social and political ties that link the necessary reorganization of networks
with institutional change.  In this view, industrial networks were politically constructed by
distinct groups of firm and public actors to obtain resources and develop informal regimes of
authority for the coordination of improvised routines under the uncertainties of shortage.  Similar
to the literature in economic sociology, this view understands change as evolutionary, where new
firms largely emerge not from a tabula rasa but as part of the reorganization of networked assets.
While interlinked assets curb individual discretion, the experimental process of asset
reorganization also impedes cooperation via contractual methods. Yet, this view departs from
much of the economic sociology literature in understanding that existing networks only function
in a specific, in this case previous, political-institutional context.  Historical social bonds can fail
as well to mediate change and conflict over asset reorganization since they are derived from
previous political relations with public institutions that provided key resources and bases of
network authority structures.  In turn, the experimental process of asset reorganization extends to
the simultaneous experimental process of creating new roles for public institutions.
This paper applies my approach in two empirical ways.  First, I examine the Czech
machine-tool network, a sector of historical strength in Czech industry and, in general, of growth
in manufacturing SMEs.  In 1990, the sector embraced voucher privatization and had a network5
structure that was in many ways optimal for firm creation and innovation.  The network,
however, quickly fragmented and became insolvent as member firms were unable to cooperate
on product development and out sourcing.  I argue that a key reason for its demise was the
institutional change was enacted.  The ability of machine-tool firms to cooperate in the past
depended on the network authority structure in which several firms had build alliances with
former communist regional and district councils to obtain resources and provide bargaining
power.  Alterations in the authority structure of a network emerged from both changes in the
economic environment, like the relative importance of a particular product, and changes in the
political-institutional environment, like privatization rules, financial regulations, and public
sector reforms.  Under new uncertainties, interdependent firms were unable to cooperate over the
reorganization of common assets, since the ability of one member to impose its will on or give
reliable guarantees of compensation to another member depended not only on the risk associated
with the investment and the historical bonds between them but also the support of public actors
who may be no longer available.  Key machine-tool firms often lost their authority and access to
resources when the centralization of policy-making power eliminated virtually eliminated
regional and local councils and the rapid privatization of banks and the new financial regulations
gave the banks little incentive to finance restructuring.
In linking institutional and asset-reorganizational experiments, my approach can help
clarify the conditions that promote cooperation and lead to dynamic firm creation.  The
recombination of network assets is an iterative negotiating process at two levels: the selection of
restructuring projects and the creation of rules (formal or informal) about monitoring one
another.  Akin to workouts, this process is fraught with questions of how risk is shared, of who
decides what, and how the process is governed.  The history of western capitalism has shown
that workouts for both financial institutions and firms demand that public actors share some of
this risk and adjudicate conflicts over the control of assets and liabilities.  This history has also
shown that the creation of institutions to facilitate workouts, be they directed by a central bank, a
ministry, or the courts, has been an experimental one, in which public and private actors enact
one set of rules, analyze the results, and reform the existing rules.  In turn, the restructuring of
existing networks that lead to growth and firm formation in East-Central Europe depends largely
on both the ability of public actors to become risk sharers and conflict mediators and the ability
of the political system to allow public actors to experiment and learn to take on these new roles.
Polish policies appeared to facilitate manufacturing SME growth by allowing
stakeholders to lease assets and directly negotiate their use; by initiating state-backed workouts
of both banks and large firms; and by allowing local governments to directly participate in the
reorganization of manufacturing networks. These policies promoted institutional experiments
based on public actors becoming financial partners and conflict mediators and enhanced the
ability of network actors to learn and monitor one another, and thus experiment with new forms
of organization.6
Introduction
Since the decline of mass production models in the 1970s, scholars and policymakers alike have
debated over the forces that promote the creation of new firms (i.e., entrepreneurship) and the
contribution of small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) to growth and innovation.
1  Some
analysts focused on the individual entrepreneur as arbitrageur and advocated the importance of
policies that promoted the free movement of resources and market competition.  Others focused
mainly of the characteristics of inter-firm networks that promoted resource-sharing and
cooperation.
2
The events of the last decade in East-Central Europe offer scholars and policymakers a
unique opportunity to evaluate these arguments in two important ways.  First, because of
communism’s adherence to the economies of scale model, for both political and economic
reasons, and the virtual absence of the private sector and SMEs, economic renovation in the
region is closely linked not only to the restructuring of inherited state firms but also the creation
of new SMEs.
3  Second, but in sharp contrast to the reorganization of industries in advanced
countries, economic transformation in East-Central Europe is also wedded to the wholesale
creation of market-based and democratic institutions.  Thus, the changes in East-Central Europe
deepen previous debates on SMEs by linking firm creation to institutional creation: how do
approaches to institutional creation impact the creation of firms?
This essay theoretically and empirically explores this question in light of two major
analytical traditions on firm creation and SMEs while offering a third, alternative approach. On
the one hand, Kirznerian views of entrepreneurship are reflected in reform approaches that
understand transformation as discontinuous change from communism to capitalism and advocate
the rapid privatization and liberalization of the economy.
4  In these approaches, economic
renovation hinges on the ability of private individuals with secure ownership and creditor rights
to “read” clear price signals and become arbitragers to fill both market and institutional gaps.  On
the other hand, economic sociology views of entrepreneurship and innovation are reflected in
reform approaches that emphasize the continuity of past social structures determining strategy
and policy choices.
5  Firms remain embedded in old socio-economic networks, which are the
sources of trust and reciprocity that facilitate the flow of resources and information needed for7
the firm restructuring and creation. In this view, policy should be directed at preserving the
relationships of networks.
While building on the views of economic sociology, this paper attempts to offer an
alternative understanding of firm and institutional creation that accounts for both continuity and
change.  The conceptual point of departure from both approaches is that firms and
entrepreneurial activity are embedded in both social and political ties that link the necessary
reorganization of networks with institutional change.  In this view, industrial networks were
politically constructed by distinct groups of firm and public actors to obtain resources and
develop informal regimes of authority for the coordination of improvised routines under the
uncertainties of shortage.  Similar to the literature in economic sociology, this view understands
change as evolutionary, where new firms largely emerge not from a tabula rasa but as part of the
reorganization of networked assets.  While interlinked assets curb individual discretion, the
experimental process of asset reorganization also impedes cooperation via contractual methods.
Yet, this view departs from much of the economic sociology literature in understanding that
existing networks only function in a specific, in this case previous, political-institutional context.
Historical social bonds can fail as well to mediate change and conflict over asset reorganization
since they are derived from previous political relations with public institutions that provided key
resources and bases of network authority structures.  In turn, the experimental process of asset
reorganization extends to the simultaneous experimental process of creating new roles for public
institutions.
To clarify the deficiencies in the fore-mentioned dominant approaches and the advantages
of my alternative, embedded politics approach to firm and institutional creation, this paper seeks
to explain the stark differences between the Czech Republic (CR), Poland, and Hungary in terms
of entrepreneurial performance during the last decade.  Section I offers summary data on the
differences between these countries and a critique of the two dominant approaches.  Despite their
gradual approach to privatization, Poland and Hungary clearly outperform the CR in terms of
industrial output growth and the creation of manufacturing SMEs.  Section II briefly reviews the
main points of an embedded politics approach.  Sections III and IV then explore these arguments
empirically, using network and institutional data from the two extreme cases, the CR and Poland.8
The upshot, as discussed in the conclusion, is that institutional experiments based on public
actors becoming financial partners and conflict mediators enhance the ability of network actors
to learn and monitor one another, and thus experiment with new forms of organization.  Poland
facilitated such institutional experiments not only in the ways it approached the creation of
market institutions, but also in the ways it decentralized power and resources to local and
regional political actors.
I.  Explaining the Divergence in Growth and Firm Creation
By the mid-1990s the Czech Republic was viewed as the crowning success of the
depoliticization model advanced by those who viewed transformation as one of epochal change –
a leap from one complete set of organizing principles to another.
6  In this view, communist
countries were essentially composed of a unified party-state hierarchy commanding atomized
firms or individuals. During transformation, an insulated state alone can and should define and
impose a new institutional order upon a tabula rasa of atomized, self-interested actors.
Depoliticization is the ability of the state to eschew negotiations with economic actors about the
initial institutional designs and their subsequent revisions by cutting off a powerful “change
team” from society to impose rapidly a new set of rules that directly guide actors toward efficient
resolution of restructuring conflicts.
7
Three key factors enabled the Czechs to achieve depoliticization: optimal starting
conditions, an autonomous, powerful change team, and policies for rapid liberalization and
privatization.
8  Because of their orthodox political and economic policies, the communists left
the Czech Republic with a stable macro-economy, low foreign debt, weak social and political
groups, and a central government with virtually complete legal control of assets. A coalition led
by Vaclav Klaus used these conditions to virtually eliminate the powers of regional and local
governments and construct a strong policy apparatus that cut itself off from potential “rent-
seekers,” such as parliament and special interest groups. In turn, the Czech government rapidly
liberalized trade and most prices, enacted conservative monetary and fiscal policies, created
bankruptcy laws based on liquidation of defaulting debtors, instituted a limited, rule-based,9
recapitalization of banks, and, above all privatized over 1,800 firms in less than four years
through its now famous voucher method.
 9
In contrast, Hungary and Poland were deficient in all three areas.
10   Policies of partial
economic and political liberalization, particularly in the 1980s, left both countries with relatively
large fiscal deficits and foreign debt and relatively strong social groups and competing political
parties.  These economic factors created multiple goals for privatization, such as maximizing
sales revenues and maintaining employment, rather than simply keeping privatization focused on
the rapid delineation of private ownership rights. The political factors allowed organized groups
and parties to contend for policy control and enabled stakeholders, such as workers councils,
managers and local governments, to intervene in, if not exercise veto rights over, the
privatization of assets. The governments were then forced to include several potentially
conflicting aims into privatization and banking policies as well as engage in the arduous task of
re-claiming full control over assets in order to privatize them.  In turn, Hungary and Poland
experienced stop-and-go policies in privatization and the reforms of banking and commercial
laws. For instance, between 1990 and 1995, Hungary underwent three reorganizations of their
privatization agency and policy, three revisions of bankruptcy law, and a series of problematic
bank bailouts.  During the same period, Poland was unable to initiate mass privatization and
dealt with large industrial firms and banks mainly through a complex, state-backed plan for the
restructuring of bank debt.
The depoliticization agenda rests on two key premises regarding firm creation.
11  First, in
its emphasis on speed and discontinuous change, the depoliticization agenda views that the main
social and institutional ties under communism were ones that promoted cancerous bargaining
between firm managers and central state officials.  Optimal asset reorganization and firm
creation can only come about when these ties are destroyed and the state is no longer permitted
to enter into economic activities, otherwise prices and incentive will remain distorted.  Second,
mass privatization allows various claimants to assets strike “efficient bargains” so that resources
can be quickly directed to the enterprising investors. These bargains are typically the
consolidation of control rights over assets and cash flows, the liquidation of loss makers and10
delinquent debtors, the break-up of large firms, and the creation of enforceable contracts for
outsourcing and alliances.
These two premises echo common market-based understandings of entrepreneurship.
First, the emphasis on destruction of past forms of economic organization is a strong reminder of
conventional interpretations of Schumpeter that creation of the new can only come by first
destroying the old.
12  Second, the importance of clear price signals and property rights for
individuals to be able to create “efficient bargains” through secondary market arbitrage is in
direct line with Kirzner’s argument that equates wealth and firm creation with “the daring,
imaginative, speculative actions of entrepreneurs who see opportunities for pure profit in
conditions of disequilibrium.”
13  Indeed, this convergence of ideas between the two literatures
may come as no surprise, as Dusan Triska and Tomas Jezek, the architects of Czech
privatization, based their understanding of economic activity, like Kirzner, heavily on the work
of von Mises and Hayek.
14
Triska and Jezek’s philosophy served the Czechs well in receiving praise from both
independent scholars and such organizations as the IMF, World Bank, and EBRD.
15  As can be
seen in Table 1, by 1995 the Czech adherence to depoliticization had allowed the country to race
ahead of Poland and Hungary in the transfer of property from state to private hands, especially in
industry.  The Czech gains in private sector creation indeed boosted confidence in using
depoliticization model elsewhere, including Russia.
16
Ia. A Closer Look at the Data
The eventual outcomes of these contrasting approaches to transformation, however,
conflicted significantly with the expectations of the depoliticization model.  First, it has now
been well documented both by independent scholars and even the World Bank that Czech mass
privatization did not facilitate firm restructuring and new firm formation.
17  Rather, the evidence
shows that the combination of rapid delineation of private ownership rights and weak capital
market and banking regulation created incentives for short-term gains through equity arbitrage in
the secondary market and not for investment into corporate governance and reorganization.  At11
best, the subsequent creation of dominant investment funds with cross-holdings in the main
Czech banks led to mismanagement of assets, with financiers more concerned about blocking
outside investors and unwilling to bear the risks of leading corporate reorganizations.  At worst,
new Czech entrepreneurs manipulated lax rules on shareholder protection and public oversight to
reap profits through insider trading schemes and asset stripping.  Such actions not only impeded
potential new firms from making productive use of existing assets and from gaining contracts,
but they also thwarted the development of a capital market as a source of financing for both
established and new firms.  For instance, by 1998, no firm, old or new, used the Czech bourse to
raise capital while Poland saw a substantial rise in the liquidity and amount of capital raised in its
bourse.
18
Second, the divergence in the performance of financial entrepreneurs was matched by
that of industrial entrepreneurs.  Despite the rapid increase in private control over GDP and
industry, the Czech Republic significantly lagged Hungary and Poland in the growth of both
industrial output and manufacturing SMEs.
19  (See Figure 1 and Table 2.
20)
The two sets of evidence clearly present explanatory problems for the depoliticization
approach to transformation and the Kiznerian view of entrepreneurship. The collapse of the
Czech capital market and strengthening of the Polish market, on the one hand, and the significant
differences in industrial output and manufacturing SME growth undercut the argument that rapid
state withdrawal from the economy and rapid delineation of property rights lead to growth and
firm creation.  One way to save the depoliticization approach is to argue that contrasting banking
policies allowed Hungarian and Polish start-ups had better access to bank credit than their Czech
counter parts.  Yet, the existing evidence, particularly during the first half of the decade, shows
that Czech SMEs and start-ups had relatively greater access to bank loans.
21
Another way to save the tabula rasa understanding of transformation is to argue that firm
creation has little to do with the existing state sector, as long as governments pursue strict fiscal
and monetary policies, liberalize markets, protect private property rights.
22  A good example of
this view is the work of Johnson and Loveman (1995), who argue that Poland’s growth comes
from the development of de novo private SMEs and not necessarily the reform and privatization12
of the existing state firms.  De novo firms adapt relatively better and faster to the new conditions
than existing state firms since they start from scratch and are smaller.  That is, lacking the
organizational baggage of existing firms and utilizing their relatively small size, de novo firms
can quickly resolve the “complementarity” problem – the simultaneous reorganization of the
strategy, structure, and compensation systems of a firm’s operations (pp. 104-105).
While it may be true that new, small firms have relative adaptability advantages over
existing large firms, this argument becomes self-defeating.  The basic problem is that in order to
sustain the importance of clear property rights and mass privatization, Johnson and Loveman
must argue the development of new private firms has no connection to existing state firms, other
than the latter free up resources.  First, this argument ultimately ignores the fact that Poland’s
governments made significant interventions into the restructuring of the financial and industrial
sectors and followed a gradualist path of transforming ownership, capital markets, and
governance institutions.  These actions not only violate rules of clear property rights and
incentives but also are critical background conditions for the creation of new firms (see below).
Second, Johnson and Loveman’s own empirical evidence shows government assistance with debt
reduction as key to the restructuring of transforming state firms and the importance of linkages
between existing state firms and new private manufacturing firms as channels of sales, supplies,
facilities, and personnel.
23
The upshot is that one cannot explain dynamic new firm formation without understanding
the linkages between the past and the present, the inherited state sector and the emerging private
one as sources of incubation and resources.  Indeed, one of the few recent multi-country
econometric analyses of de novo firms suggests this.
24  Moreover, even if one tries to base the
relative performance differences on Poland and Hungary’s former second economies, the
research on this small private sector under communism clearly shows that it was intimately
woven into the operations of state firms.
25
Ib.  Continuity and the Role of Socio-economic Networks13
Much of the work in economic-sociology has focused on the importance of inter-firm
networks, as opposed to markets or hierarchies, in determining the ability of firms to adapt and
innovate.  In this view, the different structure, density, and strength of inter-firm ties help gauge
the ability of firms to cooperate, access new information, maintain market positions, and
innovate.
26
The work of David Stark is the most prominent in extending the field into analysis of
post-communist countries.
27  First, Stark was among the first scholars who showed that
communist economies were less collections of atomized firms hierarchically commanded by the
party state and more akin to constellations of firms embedded in a variety of horizontal and
vertical social and economic ties that grew out of improvised responses to the uncertainties of the
shortage environment.  Second, he argued that after the collapse of communism, firms remained
embedded in these ties, and, thus, emphasized the continuity of past socio-economic structures.
The reproduction of network ties not only promoted a diversity of experiments for firms to
“recombine” assets but also provided them with norms of reciprocity and reliable channels of
information and resources vital for generating and selecting restructuring strategies.
This approach is extremely useful in that it directs comparative analysis away from the
use of idealized images of modern capitalism as benchmarks for reform to the use of mid-range
analytical categories that help highlight the distinctive patterns of economic organization created
within and across countries during transformation.  Moreover, in demonstrating that the network,
rather than the firm, was the unit of analysis, Stark reveals how old ties turn Johnson and
Loveman’s “complementarity” problem into an inter-firm issue that links existing state firms to
the creation of new firms.  However, in his emphasis on the preservation of network relations
and on the disconnection of the process of asset recombination from that of network
reorganization, Stark reveals the limitations of economic sociology explaining the divergence in
growth and firm creation, and in general the relationship between firm creation and institutional
transformation.
First, although Stark shows how networks can impact asset recombination, his emphasis
on continuity over determines the ability of old ties to govern asset reorganization under new14
uncertainties in ways that lead to productive outcomes, rather than, say, to self-dealing or
mismanagement.  For instance, Stark argues that the Czech case is a prime example where past
informal network relationships were best preserved and formalized into sound governance
institutions writ large by a responsive government.  His evidence is the emergence of the
complex interlocking ownership and financial links among the main Czech banks, their
investment funds, and the overlapping portfolios of privatized state firms.  In light of the
evidence on Czech privatization discussed above – both the aggregate economic data as well as
the virtual collapse of the Czech capital market – one must question whether the reproduction of
“old school” ties are sufficient mechanisms for governing restructuring.  Although the
investment funds of the main Czech banks did not appear responsible for the most glaring cases
of asset stripping, any vestiges of associationalism were apparently insufficient to help the banks
and funds cooperate, select restructuring projects and invest in the corporate governance of
jointly controlled firms.
28
Such empirical problems reveal a second, theoretical limitation to the work in economic
sociology.  In focusing on socio-economic ties among firms, this approach is remarkably silent
about how institutional change may inter-act directly with network reproduction, other than
emphasizing institutional policies that preserve past network ties.  For instance, Stark argues that
reversals in Czech policies to partially suspend bankruptcy laws and to use public finances to
net-out chains of inter-firm debt were positive recognitions of the importance of inter-firm
networks.  Yet to what end?  The evidence shows that the netting out policy did little to lower
debt and was cancelled, since firms were unwilling to cooperate and fully reveal their
liabilities.
29  Conversely, evidence that Polish SMEs use relatively high levels of inter-firm credit
and leasing arrangements, without creating unmanageable leverage, suggests that Polish policies
have not only helped preserve but also reorganize intra-network relations.
30  In turn, if past
norms were insufficient to aid firms to cooperate over restructuring and debt reduction, then
either the inherited network relationships had been altered in some significant way or they lacked
qualities in and of themselves to help firms adjust to the new uncertainties.  In either case, one
would have to surmise that institutional factors can have a direct impact on the ability of
networks to alter themselves and on the ways network actors select a set of restructuring
strategies over another.  But this would lead one to move beyond the purview of economic15
sociology, since conventional network analysis largely ignores changes in networks nor
integrates institutional-political factors into its understanding of the origins of inter-firm
networks.
Id.  An Embedded Politics Approach
The alternative, embedded politics approach advanced in this paper attempts to identify
factors that continue to shape and constrain firm strategy, such as economic and social links that
tie actors to common assets, as well as factors that can alter the structure and cohesion of
inherited networks, such as specific institutional supports for networks.  This approach departs,
then, from conventional network analysis in understanding that firms are embedded in socio-
political networks that are constructed and re-constructed by specific firms and public actors
under different political-economic regimes.  By clarifying the factors that shape the movement
from one equilibrium to another, one can begin to specify the conditions that promote or impede
firm formation in post-communist countries.
The basis for advancing an embedded politics approach to entrepreneurship in post-
communism is twofold.  First, there is increasing evidence from a variety of East European
countries that industrial networks include not just firms but also regional bank and party council
officials.
 31   For instance, my own research has shown that even in the relatively orthodox
communist Czechoslovakia planning experiments allowed mid-level institutions, such as
industrial associations (VHJs) and regional councils, to take on greater decision-making rights
over, respectively, production and the provision of social-welfare services.
32  Distinct patterns of
industrial networks grew around different VHJs.  Constituent suppliers, customers, managers and
work groups formed alliances with local state bank branches and party councils to gain privileges
from the state center and create informal channels of coordination to adjust to the uncertainties of
the shortage economy.  These alliances solidified the network authority structure, since they
were sources of political and financial risk sharing to limit central intervention and facilitate the
autarky and improvisation needed to adapt to an ineffective institutional structure.16
Second, much of the research on the importance of inter-firm networks in advanced
industrialized countries came out of the work on industrial districts.
33 This research emphasized
not only the determining influence of different network characteristics on firm behavior but also
the political-institutional architecture that was interwoven with inter-firm relationships.
In the embedded politics approach, a key variable is power.  The power a firm or plant
may have over assets and the creation of formal and informal rules of inter-firm relations is
derived from not only one’s position in the value-chain, such as a critical supplier or purchaser,
but also the strength of one’s ties to local public actors, such as bank and party-council officials
during communism.   A network may be more hierarchical or more egalitarian, depending on the
mix of these two factors.  This understanding of the construction of the authority structures of
economic networks becomes critical for post-communist restructuring in two ways.
First, alterations in the authority structure of a network emerge from both changes in the
economic environment, like the relative importance of a particular product, and changes in the
political-institutional environment, like privatization rules, financial regulations, and public
sector reforms.  Under new uncertainties, interdependent firms may be unable to cooperate over
the reorganization of common assets, since the ability of one member to impose its will on or
give reliable guarantees of compensation to another member depends not only on the risk
associated with the investment and the historical bonds between them but also the support of
public actors who may be no longer available.  For instance, in the Czech Republic (CR) firms
often lost their authority and access to resources when the centralization of policy-making power
eliminated virtually eliminated regional and local councils and the rapid privatization of banks
and the new financial regulations gave the banks little incentive to finance restructuring.
Second, in linking institutional and asset-reorganization experiments, the approach can
help clarify the conditions that promote cooperation and lead to dynamic firm creation.  As
suggested already by my discourse, the recombination of network assets is an iterative
negotiating process at two levels: the selection of restructuring projects and the creation of rules
(formal or informal) about monitoring one another.  Akin to workouts, this process is fraught
with questions of how risk is shared, of who decides what, and how the process is governed.  The17
history of western capitalism has shown that workouts for both financial institutions and firms
demand that public actors share some of this risk and adjudicate conflicts over the control of
assets and liabilities.
34  This history has also shown that the creation of institutions to facilitate
workouts, be they directed by a central bank, a ministry, or the courts, has been an experimental
one, in which public and private actors enact one set of rules, analyze the results, and reform the
existing rules.  In turn, the restructuring of existing networks that lead to growth and firm
formation in East-Central Europe will depend largely on both the ability of public actors to
become risk sharers and conflict mediators and the ability of the political system to allow public
actors to experiment and learn to take on these new roles.
The rest of this paper will empirically illustrate this argument, by applying this approach
first to analyze the fragmentation and demise of a potentially prosperous Czech machine-tool
network, and then to analyze the respective political institutional conditions that facilitated
network restructuring and firm creation in Poland.  Although the data presented here, particularly
with respect to the latter cases, is somewhat incomplete, the evidence suggests Polish growth was
due to two key factors: the initiation of policies that allowed public and private actors to engage
jointly in the gradual reorganization of assets and policies that fostered the participation of local
public actors in restructuring.  Rather than drawing bright lines between the public and the
private, between the center and the periphery, such policies understood restructuring as a
negotiated process, in which rules of participation helped public and private actors share
information and learn how to monitor one another’s use of common assets.
II.  The Fragmentation of Old Ties
Czech machine tool firms form a vital part of the country’s machinery and equipment sector,
which was the engine of industry for Czechoslovakia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire and
continued even during the decline of the 1990s to account largest share of manufacturing
employment and second largest share of manufacturing value added in the CR.
 35  The Czech
firms were also the premier machine tool suppliers to the CMEA during communism and among
the top 8 nations in machine tool production in the world for much of the post-WWII period.
36
Since the mid-1970s, scholars have viewed the machine tool industry worldwide as a18
paradigmatic example of SME creation and flexible specialization.
37  With their decades of
experience and skill, Czech machine tool firms were poised to join this trend in 1990.  Moreover,
the traits of the network of these firms and their embrace of rapid privatization pointed in their
favor.
First, by 1990 the machine tool industry was already organized into many legally
independent firms, as opposed to a few large, vertically integrated firms that were common in
other branches.
38 During communism, the VHJ, TST, managed the large majority of firms and
plants that produced machine tools and many of their key components.  By the late 1980s, TST
had over 20 firms, comprising about 30,000 employees and a rather broad production profile of
machines and components. When Czechoslovakia dissolved the VHJ system in 1987-88, TST
members (including many plants) chose to become legally independent state firms.  This
movement toward deconcentration grew out of TST’s a polycentric network, which possessed
many qualities associated with networks that facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge, flexibility,
and access to new information and resources.
39  (See Figure 2.)  Structurally, there were several
central firms that worked with the directorate on a consensual basis, and members had retained
considerable decision-making powers and independent financial accounts.  Relationally,
although members had a deep history of overlapping, direct social and professional ties, they
were usually horizontally associated with limited direct operational links and had often generated
their own links outside of TST. For instance, a TST firm typically focused on a certain class of
machines, had several plants, and produced over 80% of its inputs in-house.  While parts like
hydraulics, pneumatics, and ball bearings, as well as specific metal castings, came from other
members, the firms acquired certain electronic components from other VHJs jointly via the TST
directorate or directly, depending on the quality of their local professional linkages.  A key
reason for the development of this polycentric network with its combination of rich social ties
and potential “brokerage” opportunities for members
40 was that most member firms developed
direct links to regional bank branches and regional/district administrative-communist party
councils.  These linkages aided firms in managing inter-firm debts, mediated delivery disputes
with non-TST firms in the region, and were sources of countervailing bargaining power vis-à-vis
one another, the TST directorate, and the central state ministries.19
Second, in 1990 and 1991 and in the face policies directed at the dissolution of regional
councils, the weakening of local councils, strict banking laws, and rapid privatization, the ex-TST
firms took advantage of their network structure by embracing privatization, spinning off new
firms, and grafting indirect equity alliances onto their inherited social.  The firms and plants
entered privatization individually (mostly via vouchers).  In 1991, ex-TST firms had already
broken themselves up into 40 firms, with the 6 largest allowing their plants to operate as semi-
autonomous profit centers and prepare themselves for eventual spin-offs.  At the same time, ex-
TST firms sought to balance individual autonomy with group cohesion by bolstering past
professional ties with new equity and financial ones.  In particular, members sought to combine
social and equity links to help manage areas in which they lacked individual resources and know-
how, such as in foreign trade, common trademarks, critical supplies, vocational training, and
development loans.  They converted the former TST directorate into the support headquarters of
new machine tool association, SST, in which each firm was an owner.  SST, in turn, used its
historical ties to actors in the trade and financial sectors to take a 30 to 40% equity stake in one of
the major trade houses, Strojimport, and build an alliance with members of the foreign trade
financial group, FINOP, and the Czech Republic’s main trade bank, CSOB.  With FINOP and
CSOB, SST created a new private bank, Banka Bohemia, and an equity investment company,
ISB, whose engineering fund bought strategic stakes in SST member firms and important
suppliers/customers.
41  The result of this elaborate equity and financial alliance can be seen in
Figure 3.  Member firms would renew past direct ties with one another owned, and via SST have
a collective brokerage link outside the group. While member firms owned SST, SST ran the
boards of Strojimport and the engineering fund, provided strategic information to its members,
and aided members in negotiations with banks, notably via Banka Bohemia.
By mid-1996, however, the industry had fragmented into insolvency.  The attempt by SST
members to preserve their past social relationship, reinforce them with new governance
mechanisms of equity and contracts, and also replace past public external partners with new
private financial ones did little to promote cooperation and restructuring.
First, the uncertainties of new production experiments demanded a reorganization of existing
network ties and undermined the cooperation between member firms.  As each firm began to20
experiment with new products or alterations of existing ones, they turned to one another for the
development or sub-contracting of certain components and the cost sharing of exporting and
importing (especially for CNC electronics).  Since these experiments were highly uncertain and
often conflicted with one another, no firm could give the guarantees to the others to forego their own
plans and invest in those of the solicitor.  For instance, with the collapse of trade in the CMEA and
the domestic recession, SST firms sought new market niches based on short pilot production runs.
Even when the solicitor demonstrated that the trial runs were for a credible international client, these
runs were often too short with poorly defined future revenue streams to instill confidence in other
members to prioritize their own component production for the given project.  Experimentation had
also led member firms often to encroach on one another’s product lines in such a way that had firms
fearing that collaboration would undermine individual export revenues.
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Secondly, the supporting equity alliances failed to provide needed financing to overcome the
hold-up problems among members.  As one of the “big-five” Czech banks, CSOB was the critical
financial link in the alliance.  Yet the combination of the collapse of CMEA trade, new creditor
rules, and government enforcement of hard budget constraints, left CSOB and Strojimport with a
large stock of non-performing credits and weak capital bases.  CSOB, in turn, refused to initiate the
restructuring of Strojimport and provide credit lines to Banka Bohemia and SST firms.  A typical
option would be the use of institutional workout mechanisms, in which public actors share some of
the risks and create rules for the multiple parties to assets to negotiate iteratively over the
restructuring of both operations and financing.  Czech transformation policy eliminated any role for
extended participation by public actors and any mechanism for joint management of assets, other
than voluntary contracts.  For instance, bank restructuring was reduced to a one-time, partial
recapitalization and debt-removal, leaving banks on their own to deal with troubled firms.
Bankruptcy was reduced to a fast track to liquidation, and has now been well documented to be
ineffective.
43  Given the tight interdependencies between the banks and industrial firms, the big
Czech banks found it too risky to lead bankruptcies or restructuring, and SST firms languished.
Indeed, in 1994, four of the five largest de novo banks, including Banka Bohemia, were seized by
regulators and closed.21
Neither the old social relationships among firms nor the new equity alliances with financial
and trade organizations were sufficient to provide credible structures for negotiated management of
claims to common assets, be they production plants or import-export ventures. The next best option
for a firm is to forego collaboration, vertically integrate needed assets, and, ultimately, resort to
financial manipulation.  This scenario reached even the most successful SST firm, ZPS.
Between 1992 and 1995, ZPS more than doubled its total sales and exports. The firm
penetrated new export markets for final products, such as redesigned horizontal machining centers
and multi-spindle lathes, as well as for semi-finished goods, such as steel castings and pallet
exchangers.
44  A key factor in ZPS’s success was its ability to renew its own local socio-political
network and use it to build new channels of financing and export contacts.  In contrast to other SST
firms, ZPS did not discard civic-social assets (health clinic, power station, apartments, community
center) that the communists typically put on the books and sites of firms.  Rather, ZPS co-managed
and co-financed them with the local government and entrepreneurs.  Coupled with the management’s
active participation in the country’s “velvet revolution,” these actions afforded ZPS significant social
and political capital in the Zlin district, which they converted to socio-economic capital.  For
instance, ZPS gained financing from employees and local citizens in 1991-92 when other firms had
little via a company based credit union and a locally placed bond issue.  Also, employee shares and a
community voucher fund together held about 20% of equity in ZPS, over which management had de
facto control. From this base, ZPS management cultivated a network of local and foreign
entrepreneurs, who were former ZPS or big bank employees.  This network opened up new export
markets to ZPS and helped create a set of allied, medium-sized investment funds and banks that
channeled strategic information and financing to ZPS. To sustain the growth and increase the
revenue streams from its component plants, the heavily leveraged ZPS had originally planned to
gradually spin-off up stream operations and utilize other SST firms for more areas of sub-
contracting.  Yet, as SST relationships fragmented and firms bordered on default, ZPS found it too
risky to engage such a strategy.
45  Instead, ZPS sought to acquire other SST firms by mid 1995.  The
question, of course, was how would they obtain control of the other firms, given that the big five
Czech banks and the dominant investment funds had proven useless as sources of direct financing.22
 The answer is that a well-placed network can be used for self-dealing and domination as
easily as it can be used for collaborative production.  And when there are no institutions to help
actors extend the time horizons and reformulate their methods of mutual monitoring and project
selection through joint-deliberation, the former strategy is optimal.  ZPS and its local allies, in turn,
used their elaborate network of new small banks and investment funds to channel financing from the
banks’ depositors and a poorly monitored state insurance company to ZPS, gain strategic control of
ZPS shares as well as manipulate share prices of ZPS and other companies.  At the same time, it
sought to control the SST board and the engineering investment fund mentioned above.  With its
new finances, manipulation of share prices, and influence over SST’s fund, ZPS management
orchestrated a series of take-overs of several of the fledgling SST member firms.  The idea was that
continued refinancing of existing debt and potential income streams as an oligopolist would reduce
its leverage over time.  This scheme came crashing down in late 1996 when two of their small banks
went insolvent and regulators seized the insurance company as its weakness threatened the stability
of the financial system.
In many respects, the inability of private contractual and ownership methods to resolve
the hold-up and collective action problems are well known already in the work on uncertainty,
incomplete markets, and common asset management.
46  But much of this literature also argued
that the first steps toward collaboration would often depend on pre-existing social structures and
a patterned history of mutual exchange.
47  Clearly, this shift in the literature opens the door for
the continuity approaches to transformation that stress the importance of the reproduction of past
social capital and certain inter-firm network structures as determinants of collaboration and
performance.  Yet despite the structural and relational qualities of the SST network and the
conscious efforts by members to fortify them, SST firms came to view one another as
competitors. Neither the old school ties nor positions on the various boards were sufficient to
convince assumed financial and trade allies to divert dwindling resources to the SST firms.
One can begin to make sense of the failure of past social relations and equity ties to
mediate the disputes among SST firms if one integrates political and institutional constructs into
the definition of social capital and networks.  As depicted in Figure 2, the alliances that TST
firms had with regional and district administrative councils and bank branches were key sources23
of mediation and authority that supported the polycentric network.  While the council and
branches collaborated with relevant firms to provide resources and coordinate economic activity,
they also provided countervailing power vis-à-vis other strong member firms and the directorate
of TST.  In this view, the councils, for instance, provided political and financial capital to allied
firms not only to engage in strategies of forced substitution and autarky, but also to maintain
their level of autonomy and influence in bargaining within TST.  The Czech agenda of
depoliticization altered this equilibrium in three fundamental ways.
First, bent on centralizing power, the central government not only cut off regular
communication with firms but also literally and figuratively eliminated traditional external
partners of the firms – the local governments.  Second, the agenda offered firms only a few
private actors with existing resources as new external allies.  Third, the agenda offered no
framework for public support of extended multi-party negotiations for asset recombination, be it
through a workout mechanism or through regional development initiatives.
On the one hand, the limited number of potential allies shifted the authority structure of
SST’s network.  Whereas previously the polycentric structure and quasi-brokerage positions of
various members emanated from ties to district and regional bank branches and councils, after
1990, as shown in Figure 2, the new alliances with banks and trade companies were concentrated
via the SST directorate.  The effectiveness of these new alliances depended in part on a level of
cooperation and confluence of interests among SST firms that had existed only when firms had
their own bases of resources and political leverage via, notably, the councils.  On the other hand,
the new external allies alone lacked the political and financial capital to credibly mediate intra-
SST disputes and share risk with these firms – and thus help reconstruct the social ties and
authority structure of the network.  The only institutional means available were voluntary
contracts, liquidation, and poorly regulated investment funds. As already mentioned, the
combination of uncertainty and interdependencies between banks and industrial made bank led
restructuring too risky. Rather, banks and their funds minimized investment in corporate
governance and focused on arbitrage activities in the secondary equity markets.  In turn, SST
relations fragmented and new resources were unavailable for spin-offs or start-ups in the
industry.
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To a certain degree, one can interpret ZPS actions as generated from its advantageous
“brokerage” position and capital, which emerged via ZPS’s conscious efforts to rebuild and
convert its own local socio-political network into a source of sales and financing.  These actions
were sufficient for ZPS to restructure itself and begin new lines of potentially lucrative products.
Yet, brokerage is a two-way profession and depends still on the integration of supporting public
institutions.  On the one hand, the broker needs a reasonably stable core network (SST) to put
existing assets and information to new uses without taking full responsibility for them.  On the
other hand, as the core network collapses and total control becomes paramount to the broker’s
entrepreneurial aspirations, the broker (ZPS) demands ever more resources to consolidate its
position (and avoid default).  Local public actors could no longer participate, as they lacked
resources and a political framework to coordinate actions with other SST localities or the central
ministries.  Moreover, without institutionalized mechanisms to encourage existing financiers to
share the risk in the broker’s consolidation, the broker’s private allies must mirror the broker’s
domination strategy to capture any available financial resources.  For ZPS’s allies this meant a
short-term strategy of manipulating the values of their own investment portfolios and for ZPS to
gain debt-finance via their own banks and the Czech insurance company.  Notice that the
brokerage strategy ends in a domination strategy – of both the broker’s former core network and
its financial channels – when there are no adequate institutions to facilitate extended negotiation
and multi-party risk sharing.  Ultimately, the incentives lead to systemic failure, when the state
can no longer ignore the damage.  Creditors seized the banks of the allies and the Czech
insurance company, and ZPS was forced to enter a new state administered restructuring agency
in 1999.
III.  Enabling Restructuring and Institutional Experiments in Poland
The Czech failures suggest that asset recombination between interlinked parties forces two levels
of experimentation – with the reorganization of the network and with new roles for public actors,
particularly at the regional levels, to assist. First, the reorganization of the network challenges the
existing authority structure and its existing terms of cooperation.  Restructuring can advance then
with institutional mechanisms that facilitate extended multi-party deliberations – deliberations25
that may begin about the exploration and selection of new projects but, in turn, become ones on
generating new modes of mutual monitoring and asset control.  Second, because public actors are
integral to existing networks and tend to be vital players in such deliberations elsewhere in the
world, network reorganization is intimately linked to the exploration of new roles for public
actors.  As with differences between “law on the books” and “law in practice,” the definition and
enforcement of institutional mechanisms is as much about power and resources as it is about the
trial-and-error process.
49  In turn, the development of any institutional mechanisms promoting
multi-party deliberations will demand not only government initiative but also the delegation of,
at least, powers for different public actors to experiment with new roles and help define what a
new policy, law, or whole institutional framework may become.
The Polish approach to transformation, thought not always intentionally, has contrasted
sharply with the Czech approach on both of these levels of experimentation.  The Poles created
mechanisms that enabled stakeholders and outsiders as well as public and private actors to
negotiate over time the reorganization of assets and the redefinition of property rights.  First,
rather than focus on rapid mass privatization, the Poles created legal vehicles that tied ownership
transformation to the restructuring of assets.  Second, central, regional, and local governments
played significant roles in initiating, financially supporting, and monitoring the negotiated
transformation of property rights and the restructuring of assets – for both large and small firms.
In short, one can explain relative strength in Polish industrial growth and manufacturing
SMEs by a set of policies that helped network actors to reorganize their overlapping claims to
assets over time.  These policies had two key traits.  First, while private property rights remained
blurred, the government, at all three levels, delegated public authority for asset restructuring to
private actors.  This authority was linked to a set of rules and incentives to induce monitoring via
continuous, multi-party deliberations over experiments with reassignments of asset control and
use.  Second, the use of government political and financial capital not only helped initiate the
reorganizational process but also maintain it, since the capital enabled resources to continue
flowing from large, state firms to smaller spin-offs and de novo ones.  Together the two traits
resemble the main properties of workout vehicles found in advanced industrialized countries:26
breathing space for the parties to assets to experiment with reorganization projects and rules that
promoted mutual monitoring through iterative, disciplined negotiations.
The rest of the paper examines these different policies in Poland and their impact on the
recombination of network assets.
IIIa.  Polish Privatization and SMEs
The very political forces and the 1990 law on Privatization of State Enterprises that
legalized the veto powers of worker councils and effectively blocked rapid, mass privatization
led to an approach that focused less on defining clear private ownership rights and more on
delegating use rights and getting assets reorganized.  The first part of the approach opened two
routes that focused mostly on medium-sized firms, empowered stakeholders and facilitated the
transfer of assets to existing network actors.  One route, “liquidation” sent firms through a
bankruptcy procedure.
50  For instance, the most prominent liquidation route (Article 19) included
1464 firms or over 26% of all and 37% of non-agricultural firms subject to ownership
transformations by the end of 1996.
 51  Although the details of the data lack clarity, previous
research shows that as much as half of these assets of completed projects were partially
restructured, kept as going concerns, and sold or leased to stakeholders and outsiders.
52  The
downside of these court-based proceedings has been their slowness – for instance, as of
December 1996 about only 34% of Art. 19 projects were completed.
The other route, probably the most efficient and dynamic, came through Article 37 of the
1990 Law, and is commonly known as “direct privatization.”
53  This law allowed employee
councils to legally dissolve the state firm and then have the assets be sold or leased to a new
company, often comprised of insiders.
54 By December of 1996, 1247 firms or over 22% of all
and 31% of non-agricultural firms subject to ownership transformation entered direct
privatization.  Direct privatization accounted for almost 30% of all non-bank privatization
revenues.
55 Almost 40% of firms were in manufacturing.  By the end of 1996, 97.9% projects in
direct privatization were completed, far surpassing the completion rates for “liquidation” and27
especially the “indirect privatization” paths of commercializing firms and then selling them case-
by-case or via the voucher investment funds (14.9%).
The lease option has accounted for over two-thirds of direct privatization projects and by
the end of 1995 accounted for more employees than those in the “indirect” path.
56  This option
was effectively a way for stakeholders to create a management-employee buyout (MEBO)
through state-subsidized financing.  The new company had to have at least 50% of employees of
the original firm and make an initial down payment of 20% of book value.  In return, it received
a below market interest rate and could defer payments for one to two years.  Research has shown
that MEBOs and firms in direct privatization in general have performed well: the financial,
productivity, and output indicators of the firms surveyed tend to be better than national and
sectoral averages, and by 1998 only 23 MEBO firms had defaulted on their lease payments.
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The studies also show that the majority of firms were undertaking organizational, process, and
product innovations.
The use of Articles 19 and 37 for ownership transformation, particularly MEBOs, made
three critical contributions toward network reorganization.  First, as opposed to focussing on
delineation of ownership rights, these routes made asset restructuring and the reordering of
property simultaneous and gradual.  Not only were assets often partially cleaned up and made
available for stakeholders – of the old or related firms, but also the leasing arrangements
effectively were incentive contracts that tied the option for full ownership to the reorganization
and efficient use of assets
Second, these routes set a general tone that multi-party negotiations and consultations
were necessary for linking restructuring and ownership change.  For instance, Article 37 required
that a majority of employees approve the process and, for MEBOs, form the new company.
Article 19, though apparently less efficient, effectively avoided zero-sum outcomes by forcing
creditors (banks and suppliers) and managers to generate a basic restructuring plan and find a
new owner that was willing to also accept the existing workforce.  Given often the legacy of tight
linkages between firms and plants and the use of social relationships among them to coordinate
decisions, this implicitly meant a degree of inter-firm negotiation about such actions.
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Moreover, public actors, notably the 49 voivodships (regional administrations) that received
responsibility over most firms as their “founders,” became central in facilitating dispute
resolutions and consultations among firms. As the founder of an enterprise, the voivodship could
initiate or block a liquidation petition, was charged with screening and vetting direct
privatization projects before they were passed to the central Ministry of Ownership
Transformation for final approval, and negotiated with MEOB candidate about certain terms of
repayment.  As such, the voivodship was negotiating with and mediating between the various
stakeholders and competing claimants to assets.  Moreover, as an agent of the central
government charged with monitoring compliance with the various agreements, it collaborated
with other public agencies, firms and banks to pool information and learn more about the
activities and problems of firms in the region.
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Third, the central and regional governments helping share the risk of restructuring and as
such provided breathing space for firms to experiment with restructuring strategies and a way to
learn how to effectively monitor the users of subsidies.  For instance, Article 19 provided an
initial experiment for firms to receive debt relief and banks and voivodships to follow the results.
The leasing option was an innovation on SME subsidies, not only due to the use of an incentive
contract but also due to the delegation of powers to the voivodships, which were better
positioned than central authorities to pool local information and develop ex ante and ex post
monitoring capabilities.
IIIb. Polish Privatization and Workouts of Large Firms
Another consequence of the blocking of a Polish form of voucher privatization was a shift in
policy toward the largest firms and banks.  With case-by-case privatizations and existing
bankruptcy procedures taking much time, the government had to become more proactive and
address large firm restructuring as a key part of more gradual ownership change.  In turn, the
government initiated two simultaneous policies: a state-backed workout regime and a strong
regulatory framework for both capital markets and a limited use of vouchers.  Together, these
two sets of policies were based on the three principles just discussed: tying restructuring to
ownership transformation, creating government monitored mechanisms to promote extended29
deliberations on restructuring among parties to assets, and using public actors to share some of
the risk of restructuring.  These policies had arguably an important, though often indirect, impact
on SME creation and network restructuring:  they kept a flow of resources via large firms to
SMEs, they bolstered the use of the capital market for IPOs, and they helped interlinked banks,
large firms, and SMEs address restructuring collectively.
Facilitating Workouts
Recall that Czech preoccupation for extended government participation in transformation
impelled them to delink ownership change from restructuring: firm restructuring would emerge
once private ownership and the new bankruptcy law were established and bank restructuring was
based on rapid privatization and a one-time, partial recapitalization and debt-relief with no
involvement of the concerned firms.  In contrast, the Poles sought to tie both ownership change
and restructuring as well as bank and firm restructuring.  Part of these objectives was met in
using from the outset bankruptcy mechanisms as a course of privatization. But these mechanisms
were still slow, due to common problems of court-based workouts in East-Central Europe.  In
turn, the Polish government took the innovative step of creating the Enterprise and Bank
Restructuring Program (EBRP) in 1993 – originally thought of as a way to address the growth of
bad debts while prepping banks and firms for privatization and initiating debt-equity swaps.  It
was innovative for three reasons.  First, while EBRP aimed to address the growing bad debt
crisis and prepping seven of the nine main commercial banks for privatization, it purposefully
linked bank and large firm restructuring.  Second, in becoming the initiator of this process, the
government recognized that not only were market incentives insufficient but also that it was also
a key stakeholder in both firms and banks, not least of all due to its responsibilities as lender of
last resort and as a creditor to both (via taxes).  Third, in linking the restructuring of the two and
thus taking charge of establishing and monitoring the criteria thereof, the government was to
become an extended participant as a financial partner and conflict mediator to the parties
involved.
The design of EBRP was rather simple.  The government offered the seven banks (which
held about 60% of outstanding enterprise debt) a one-time recapitalization sufficient to deal with
classified debts that originated prior to 1992.  In return, the banks had to establish workout30
departments and had to reach a debt resolution agreement with its debtors by March 1994, to be
fully implemented by March 1996.  Such an agreement allowed for 5 paths, including
demonstration of full debt servicing (about 40% of the 787 total firms), bankruptcy, liquidation,
debt sale, and a new regime called “bank conciliation”.  This last route became the most popular
method of dealing with problem firms (23% of firms and 50% of debt) and has been widely
judged as a successful, innovative policy that not only improved the financial and operational
performance of banks and firms but also provided strong foundation for rejuvenating the
governance of relations between financial institutions and firms.
60
Bank conciliation was a state-backed vehicle, in which the government, banks, and firms
exchanged financial assistance for property rights and reorganizational actions.  For the purpose
of the paper, the policy and the process itself had two critical impacts on network reorganization.
First, in linking restructuring of firms to debt relief, bank conciliation enhanced the ability of
network actors to recombine mutual claims and SMEs to grow. On the one hand, the
restructuring of large firm finances and operations provided a flow of resources and thus
breathing space for large and their interconnected smaller firms to experiment with new uses of
facilities and assets and new methods of contracting.  Moreover, since bank conciliation forced
operational restructuring, it provided a framework in which large firms could begin negotiations
with suppliers and customers about initiatives in spin-offs, leasing, sub-contracting, and
production changes.  On the other hand, government intervention not only broke an existing
stalemate between banks and firms, similar to that in the Czech Republic, but also provided a
vehicle in which banks could learn more about serving clients and the problems manufacturing
firms faced.  For instance, in his detailed analysis of the heavily industrialized Lodz region,
Dornisch (1997, 2000) notes that perhaps the most important outcome of EBRP in general, and
bank conciliation in particular, was that the regional bank learned how to tap back into inter-firm
networks and use them to create what he calls “project networks” for more efficient ex ante and
ex post monitoring of financing new and existing firms.  The project networks were vital to the
regional bank’s successful development of regional equity and venture capital funds.
Second, in using the principles of delegation and deliberation, bank conciliation helped
both public and private actors learn how to use negotiated solutions of common asset problems31
and learn how to develop their new roles in network restructuring.  For instance, bank
conciliation was a conscious effort by the government to overcome market inefficiencies and
centralized administration.  The government first provided financial support to the banks (and to
the firms under a separate agreement on unpaid taxes and wages) while delegating restructuring
authority to them, mainly to a lead bank.  At the same time, it set clear rules of restructuring
criteria, termination dates, and negotiating principles which it used to monitor bank and firm
compliance.  Within this framework of rules, the banks and firms negotiated the terms of
restructuring and in some cases (about 10%) debt-equity swaps.  During implementation, all
three actors had to reveal to one another regularly information on the progress of their actions
and thus begin to learn how to monitor one another and devise new roles for themselves.
Regulating Mass Privatization and the Capital Markets
As the Polish government launched EBRP, they focussed their approach to voucher
privatization and the use of the capital markets on the ways that the government could strengthen
incentives for restructuring and could become a credible risk-sharer and monitor of these
incentives.  In late 1995, the government initiated the privatization of 512 medium-large sized
firms by placing them 15 government created National Investment Funds (NIFs), which would
be owned by citizens and managed by top investment banks.  Besides the limited scope of the
program, three key differences with the Czech program have been attributed to the strengthening
incentives by funds to restructure assets (and not simply trade them) and the creation of a vibrant
capital market for financing existing and new firms.
61  First, while citizens via vouchers were
majority owners of funds, the government created incentive contracts for fund managers that tied
their revenues to firm performance and value creation.  Second, the Poles took their time in
developing a rigorous regulatory regime for securities markets that focused on public disclosure
and protection of minority rights.  Third, the government temporarily held 25% of equity in each
firm.
The combination of controlling stakes by the NIFs and the state and the strong regulatory
laws not only blocked the path of Czech type arbitrageurs but also helped build the credibility of
a new method of finance during the fragile, nascent period of the implementation of a new
institutional regime. In turn, the credibility of both restructuring incentives and the capital market32
in general helped network restructuring and SMEs in two ways: restructuring provided a
continued flow of resources and via large firms (i.e., purchases, supplies, subcontracting, etc.) to
SME development and new firm formation, while capital market credibility facilitated the
creation of perhaps the best IPO market in the region and thus a vital direct and indirect source of
SME financing.
When one combines EBRP with the privatization policies, one can see that at both the
macro- and micro levels, the Polish government was facilitating negotiated solutions to network
reorganization and project selection by becoming an interim financial partner to restructuring and
utilizing the principles of delegation and deliberation.  At the macro-level, in both EBRP and
mass privatization, the government was delegating restructuring responsibilities to private actors.
Delegation overcame first mover problems by forcing firms and banks to take action and
providing a public financial commitment (i.e., recapitalization and NIF contracts) that enhanced
the credibility of the action.  Notice that delegation is distinct from the private property rights
approaches since ownership and creditor rights are conditional; and it is distinct from traditional
economic-sociological approaches since it overtly attempts to break the existing pattern of
relations.  Deliberation occurred directly and indirectly.  It was direct in EBRP through the
simultaneous creation of performance criteria and rules for iterative, collective review by the
parties of one another’s actions.  It was indirect in the NIF program and the new regulatory
regime through the restructuring incentives and through the government monitors regularly
reviewing with the firm and NIF managers their performance and compliance.  Notice again that
deliberation attempts to order common asset governance, and not deny it, as the property rights
approaches would like; and it facilitates a process of multi-party negotiation over authority and
the reorganization of inter-actor ties, which the traditional network approaches would not view as
necessary.
At the micro-level, this process was also present via direct privatization.  MEBOs were
given limited financial support and delegated the authority over certain assets.  At the same time,
the lease agreements demanded that ownership transfer would be possible only if asset
restructuring was sufficient in paying out the lease.  One could argue that the government
indirectly instilled a similar process of gradual adjustment of inter-firm ties by inducing the33
gradual control change of assets.  In sum, the Polish approaches to privatization and debt
restructuring did not simply have the government preserve existing networks, as Stark and Bruszt
(1998) would argue, but also provided incentives and rules that guided network actors to
reorganize the authority structure and operational relations among themselves.
IIIc. Local Government
The importance of the interactive relationship between public actors and network
restructuring can be brought into sharper focus when one considers a third fundamental
difference between the Czech and Polish approaches to transformation: the role of regional and
local governments.  Both Polish and Czech reformers were highly concerned about continued
control by communist apparatchiks of regional and local councils and maintaining a unitary state.
But their methods of dealing with them contrasted sharply.  As mentioned earlier, the Czech
approach centered on concentrating power into an elite change team within the central
government and debilitating local power.  Consequently, regional governments were dissolved
and reinstated only in 1998, while district level powers diminished and municipalities
fragmented.  Solidarity had developed a strong grass roots organizational network and believed
that strengthening local democracy was vital to negating the legacy of communist centralism.  In
turn, the Poles not only maintained the 49 regional governments (voivodships) but also
strengthened the role and accountability of local governments (gminas).
Consequently, significantly different institutional settings emerged.  The CR has
fragmented innumerous, small and largely uncoordinated municipalities and weak districts.
Poland’s municipalities (gminas) are considerably fewer and larger, and are coordinated by both
the socio-political ties of Solidarity and entrepreneurial voivodships.
62 Although Czech and
Polish municipalities have roughly similar aggregate revenue and expenditure structures, the
Polish gminas and voivodships have significantly more autonomy on the setting of tax rates, and
the use of funds and organizational resources that allowed them to be relatively pro-active.  For
instance, whereas the Czechs established (principally at the order of the central government) only
2 Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in the regions with the highest unemployment, the
Pole voivodships and gminas had created 66 RDAs by 1996 throughout the country.  While34
privatization and economic restructuring rested solely in the hands of the central government in
the CR, while voivodships and to some degree gminas were from the beginning given significant
responsibilities, particularly in becoming the legal “founders” of many manufacturing firms.
Indeed, the Polish gminas have been consistently cited for their improvement in services and
their unique ability to create a vibrant municipal bond market.  Moreover, recent research in
Poland reveals high and strong correlations between the implementation of development policies
and the density and diversity of public-private institutions in voivodships, on the one hand, and
relatively high rates industrial restructuring, participation in direct privatization (especially via
MEBOs), SME creation, and the reception of FDI on the other.
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One clearly cannot overstate the impact on restructuring of a particular administrative law
or budgetary indicator.  Indeed, voivodships have also been criticized in lacking local
accountability via direct elections and sufficient financial resources and autonomy to aid
economic restructuring.
64  Nonetheless, despite their limitations, voivodships and gminas have
proven to play important roles, less as profound managers of the economy, but rather as agents of
institutional experimentation to become active participants and forums for emboldening and
reshaping the network ties among firms, banks, and one another.  This insight is critical when
one considers that the Czech counterparts were literally or figuratively eliminated from playing
any role in privatization and restructuring.  In their separate but equally detailed and extensive
research on the role of voivodships in industrial restructuring, Hausner and Dornisch show how
voivodships were able to harness their limited, but nonetheless existing, political and
organizational capital to revitalize informational, social and economic links among private and
public actors.
65
First, in exploring their legal roles as founders of many state firms and as overseers of
regional development, voivodships were most effective when they focused first on becoming an
effective monitor of firms in their jurisdictions.  To do so, they combined their relative authority
and organizational resources with the social, informational, and human resources of regional
banks, firms, consultants, gminas and the local offices of the central tax agency.  These initial
steps toward pooling diverse sources of knowledge and information became first and foremost a
resource for economic actors to expand their portfolios of strategies, collaborators and project35
screening capabilities. For instance, when EBRP was launched, the regional banks lacked
effective monitoring capabilities.  In turn, they began to supplement their deficiencies by
participating in regular regional council meetings and accessing the voivod data base,
particularly on the firms that were in EBRP and had the voivodship as its founder.  In return, the
banks began to consider the strategic goals of the voivodship, regional labor bureau, and the tax
authority regarding the firms directly and indirectly under their control.
Second, this interaction via information sharing allowed participants to begin to learn
about one another’s capabilities and interests and define some basic areas to of joint action and
risk and resource pooling.  For instance, the pilot experience in restructuring firms in EBRP, and
in some case becoming co-owners of them, led the Lodz Bank and Voivodship to co-manage a
closed World Bank investment fund for initially 20 firms. A tie such as this fortified horizontal
links among related public and private actors.
Third, it is vital to note that these developments were gradual and often initiatives failed.
But it was the continued presence and efforts of the voivodships and gminas as well as the
impulse coming from programs like EBRP and direct privatization that allowed the actors to
learn from the failure and recombine pieces of the potential inter-organizational networks.
Learning came not simply about how to evaluate a particular project but also from how to define
a reasonable set of common projects and how to assess one another’s actions and contributions.
As Dornisch emphasizes in his analysis of the revitalization of Lodz, a voivodship that went
from being a rust belt to one of the most vibrant regions of SME development and restructuring,
learning about project selection was intimately connected to learning how to monitor one another
and share authority over common assets.  Just as private and public actors were assessing the
prospects of new projects, they were also gaining experience about what were the most effective
roles one another could play.
IV.  Concluding Remarks
This essay has had two related arguments.  First, it appears that new firms arise via a
reorganization of existing inter-firm networks.  The existing approaches to transformation and36
firm creation have difficulties capturing this process.  On the one hand, the depoliticization
approaches, based on property rights and Kirznerian views of entrepreneurship, collapse in the
face of the failures of the Czech policies and the relative success of Polish policies that limited
mass privatization and enhanced the roles of central and regional governments.  On the other
hand, the fragmentation of a potentially dynamic Czech machine tool network and the collapse
of Czech investment funds points to weakness in standard economic-sociology approaches that
ignore network change.
Second, an embedded politics approach may prove more useful in analyzing restructuring
and firm creation, at least in East Central Europe.  Its core argument is that networks are socio-
political entities, the authority structure of which is constructed by economic and public actors
under specific political-institutional regimes.  Thus, while reforms in public institutions can
destabilize industrial networks and inhibit cooperation between firms and banks (and limiting
new firm creation), the interlinked experimental processes of asset restructuring and network
reorganization depends largely on the formation of new institutional workout mechanisms that
facilitate risk-sharing and continuous, disciplined deliberations among the parties to assets.
Since public actors are both constituents to networks and often key players in such institutions,
identification of workout institutions comes not simply from reference to laws, but rather from
focussing on the ways that public actors, particularly at the regional and local levels, are given
the legitimacy and resources to engage firms and explore their roles risk-sharers and initiators
and monitors of firm and bank negotiations over restructuring strategies and asset control.
Implicit in this argument is that via network reorganization firm creation depends linking
monitoring and learning.  At one level, inter-linked firms and banks are attempting to learn how
construct new formal and informal methods of mutual monitoring and project selection.  This is
where asset restructuring is tied to network reorganization.  At another level, public actors, be
they the central agencies or regional governments, are learning how provide financial and
organizational support to firms and banks while experimenting with different ways to monitor
the latter.  In turn, the embedded politics approach argues that public actors are most effective in
combining learning and monitoring, for themselves and for economic actors, when public37
policies toward transformation are based on the principles of delegation and deliberation, rather
than drawing a bright line between the public and the private or simply providing subsidies.38
Table 1:  Divergence in Privatization
Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland
% of GDP in private
Hands (1995)
70% 60% 60%
% of Industrial Output
in Private Hands
(1995)
93% 65% 60%
Sources:  EBRD (1996),  Pohl et al. (1997)
Table 2:  Divergence in SME Growth in Manufacturing
              Firms with Less than 250 Employees
Czech
Republic
(1995)
Hungary
(1998, 1997)
Poland
(1997)
Share of
Employment (%)
35% 50.2% 52.5%
Share of Sales
(%)
29.5% 37% 37%
Sources: Zemplinerova (1998), Polish Foundation for SME Promotion and Development (1999),
and Institute for Small Business Development (1999).39
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Private bank
(Banka Bohemia) )
Investment fund
(1st engineering) )
Industry association
(SST)
11
SST firms
Members
own
SST
ISB and fund own
5-20% of SST
10.7
➫   SST firms together own 30
to 40% of Strojimport.
➫   SST manages these shares.
➫   SST president is chair of
board of Strojimport.
FIGURE 3  Network Ties in the Czech Machine Tool Industry
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Czech Government
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1 For reviews of the debate, see Piore and Sabel (1984), Acs and Audretsch (1990), Sengenberger, Loveman, and
Piore (1990), and Pyke and Sengenberger (1992).  In general, the debate dates back to the works of Schumpeter
(1934) and Marshall (1923).
2   For the former, see Kirzner (1973, 1997) and Gilder (1984).  For the latter, see especially, Piore and Sabel (1984),
Powell (1990), Burt (1992), Sengenberger, Loveman, and Piore (1990), Locke (1995), Herrigel (1996), and
Saxenian (1994).  For an insightful analysis and overview of the network-entrepreneurship link in the organizational
theory literature, see Larson (1992).
3 For an East-West comparison of industrial structures, the role of scientific management, and the potential for
SMEs in industrial restructuring, see Acs and Audretsch (1993) and McDermott and Mejstrik (1992).  Whereas
SMEs accounted for about 1% of industrial employment in communist Czechoslovakia, SMEs comprised about 10%
of industrial employment in Hungary and Poland.
4 See, in particular, Kirzner (1973, 1997), Johnson and Loveman (1995),  Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995),
Sachs (1990, 1993), and North (1990) for these views on firm and institutional creation.  For a review of these and
other similar works on this issue, see Spicer, McDermott, and Kogut (2000).
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between Burt (1992) and Coleman (1990) as well as Granovetter (1985), Larson (1992), Powell (1990), and the
special issue of Strategic Management Journal (January 2000).  The work of David Stark (see below) is one of the
few conscious efforts to incorporate this literature into the East-Europe debate.
6  See Olson (1992), Murrell and Olson (1991), Boycko et al. (1995),  Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Frydman and
Rapaczynski (1994), Sachs (1990), Camdessus (1995), and World Bank (1996). Depoliticization is also evident in
the works associated with developmental statists.  See Amsden (1992), Amsden et. al. (1994), Haggard and
Kaufman (1992, 1995), and Moon and Prasad (1994).
7 See McDermott (1998, 2001) for a discussion of the depoliticization approach as it appears in various schools of
thought, including economics,  rational choice, and developmental statism.
8   Discussions on the formation of policy and the conditions in the CSFR and CR and on the optimal conditions for
reforms in general can be found in McDermott (2001, Chapter 3), Hayri and McDermott (1998), OECD (1996),
World Bank (1996), Moon and Prasad (1994), Haggard and Kaufman (1992, 1995) and Amsden et al. (1994).
9  Note that regarding policies of privatization in the region, I am only concerned with the so-called large
privatization programs, and not those focused on shops and restaurants.
10   For discussions of the different social, political, and economic conditions and policies in Poland and Hungary see
World Bank (1996), Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994),  Dabrowski et al. (1992), Levitas (1994), Stark (1992), Stark
and Bruszt (1991, 1998), Ekiert and Kubik (1999), Wittenberg (1997, 1999), and Antal-Mokos (1998).
11  Again, see McDermott (1998, 2001) for an extensive discussion of this view.  See also, Boycko, et al., 1995,
Schleifer and Vishny (1994), Sachs (1991), Camdessus (1995) and Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994).
12  The clearest connections are made in Boyco et. al. (1995), Sachs (1991) and Johnson and Loveman (1995).
13  Kirzner (1997:68).
14  Jezek (1989), Klaus and Jezek (1991) and Klaus and Triska (1989).
15 See, for instance, Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994), Boycko et al. (1995), World Bank (1996), Nellis (1999),
Camdessus (1995), EBRD (1995).
16  See, for instance, Boycko et al (1995), Rapaczynski and Frydman (1994), Nellis (1999), and World Bank (1996).
17  For U-turns by its advocates, see World Bank (1999), Sachs (1999), Johnson and Shleifer (1999), and Nellis
(1999).  For other critiques, see Coffee (1995, 1999), Spicer (et al. 2000), and McDermott (1997, 2001).
18 See Johnson and Shleifer (1999) and Coffee (1999).
19 Although surveys by the EBRD (1995) and OECD (1996) show Czech SMEs having a greater share of
employment and GDP, most of the growth in Czech SMEs were in trade, tourism and some services.  (Zemplinerova
(1995, 1998).  These are hardly sources of long-term growth and stability.  Moreover, mainstream studies of SMEs
focus on the manufacturing sectors. (Acas and Audretsch (1990, 1993)
20 While some may argue that it is problematic to compare the Czech 1995 SME data with the Polish and Hungarian
1997-98 SME data, I would argue that such a comparison should give a comparative advantage to the Czechs,54
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especially for advocates of the depoliticization model.  First, 1995 marks the greatest divergence between the CR
and Poland and Hungary in terms of private sector shares of GDP and industrial output.  Second, 1994-95 was the
period of strongest GDP growth for the CR, with the later years, especially 1997-99, seeing negative growth.  In
turn, both factors would in many ways tend to overstate the growth of SME share relative to other years.
21  The idea here is that the ability of the Hungarians and Poles to sell off many of their banks in the mid-1990s
made them more efficient.  There are two problems here.  First, not only were these sell-offs relatively late in the
1990s, but also the Czech state had minority positions in the main banks by 1994.  Second, analyses, though limited
in their sample sizes, show that Czech SMEs and start-ups had greater access to credit than their Polish and
Hungarian counterparts.  See Bratkowski et. al. (1999) and EBRD (1995).
22 This argument originates from the work of Janos Kornai (1992).
23 See in particular Chapters…..
24 Bilsen (1998) shows that de novo firms in Romania and Bulgaria outperform those in Hungary.  A key reason for
this result is not in spite of but rather because of Hungary’s SME sector and market liberalization are at later stages
of development.  That is, whereas Romanian and Bulgarian firms can reap quick growth benefits by simply entering
sectors where there are few firms, Hungary’s initial rapid growth in SMEs filling the void in markets already passed,
causing the performance Hungarian new firms to depend in many ways on the restructuring of existing state firms
and institutional development.
25 The notable works on this are Gabor (1989, 1990), Szelenyi (1988), Seleny (1991) and Stark (1986, 1989).
26 See, for instance, Granovetter 1985; Nohria and Eccles 1992; Powell 1990; Uzzi 1996, 1997; Rowley, Behrens,
and Krackhardt 2000, Kogut 2000, and Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter (2000).  For analysis on the relationship
between different types of networks and entrepreneurship, see Larson (1992) and Burt (1992).
27 Stark 1986, 1996, 1999; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Grabher and Stark 1997.
28 See World Bank (1999), Coffee (1995), and McDermott (2001, Chapters 3 and 4) for analyses of the collective
action problem that the dominant funds and banks face in investing into firms.
29 See McDermott (2001, Chapter 3).
30 Bratkowski, Grosfeld, and Rostowski 1999, Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff 2000, Jarosz 1999.
31 For work on the former USSR, Poland, GDR, and Hungary, see, for instance, Prokop (1996), Woodruff (1999),
Dornisch (1999), Jacoby (2000), Seleny (1993), Szelenyi (1988), and Levitas (1993, 1999).  Even within the work of
Stark and Bruszt (1998), there are strong suggestions of the interconnection between local political actors and
managers (see, for instance, Chapter X).
32 McDermott, 1997; Hayri and McDermott, 1998; McDermott, 1998, 2001.
33 See for instance, Saxenian, 1994; Locke, 1995; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel and Zeitlin, 1994; Herrigel, 1996;
and Grabher 1993.
34 For insightful analyses on the development of US institutions for bankruptcy, limited liability, insurance, and
lender of last resort, see Cui (1995),  Moss(1996a,b, 1998).
35 The Czech machinery and equipment sector is classified as NACE 29.  OKEC-NACE is the Czech classification
system that roughly corresponds to SIC.  Division 29 includes: (291) manufacture of machinery for the production
and use of mechanical power, (292) manufacture of other general purpose machinery, (293) Manufacture of
agricultural and forestry machinery, (294) manufacture of machine tools, (295) manufacture of other special purpose
machinery, (296) manufacture of weapons and ammunition, (297) manufacture of domestic appliances n.e.c. While
most firms discussed below are in NACE 294, some are in 295.  As late as 1997, even with the decline of industrial
employment and output, these industries and the sector as a whole remained at the heart of Czech manufacturing.
For instance, NACE 294 and 295, respectively, accounted for 11% and 29% of sales and X % of employment within
NACE 29.  NACE 29 as a whole accounted for almost 15% of total manufacturing employment (the largest of the
11 sectors in manufacturing) and about 12% of total manufacturing value-added (second only to food processing).
See publications and data by Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, 1998, at http://www.mpo.cz.
36 For a brief history of the Czech machine tool industry, see McDermott (2001, Ch. 2).
37 See, for instance, Piore and Sabel (1984), Herrigel (1996), Friedman (1988), Carlsson (1989),  Carlsson and
Taymaz (1994),  Acs, Audretsch and Carlsson (1991), and Acs and Audretsch (1990).55
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38 The following analysis of the machine tool network is based on McDermott (1998, 2001, Chapters 2 and 5).  An
analysis of other branches that possess tihgtly integrated, hierarchical networks can be found in these publications
and in Hayri and McDermott (1998).
39 See, in particular, Rowley et al. (2000), Kogut (2000), Larson (1992), Uzzi (1996), Locke (1995), Burt (1992,
1998), Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter (2000).
40 See Larson (1992), Rowley et al. (2000), and Burt (1998) for the ways these apparently opposing traits can be
optimal for firms in turbulent conditions and entrepreneurial settings.
41 The variation in the stake held by SST in Strojimport is due to changes in the structure in the firm and to ongoing
negotiations about share price.  As the network fragmented (see below), SST firms ultimately returned the shares
to the state.  Also, given the shareholding regulations and dispersion of ownership in the Czech Republic, the 3-
20% equity stakes acquired by ISB enabled SST, on behalf of ISB, to gain a seat on the management or
supervisory board of the respective firms.
42 A similar fate met the vocational training system, which severely hurt the ability of member firms to retain
existing craftsmen and train new ones  Vlacil et al. (1996) show that the combination of the government policy to
make training centers self-financing and the liquidity constraints of machine tool firms led to the virtual collapse of
vocational training in the industry.
43 See Hoshi, Mladek, and Sinclair (1998) and McDermott (1997, 1998, 2001).
44For a detailed discussion of ZPS and its strategies with various banks, funds, and the insurance company, see
McDermott (1998, 2001, Chapter 5).
45 The problems of spin-offs were common to other industries as well (Hayri and McDermott, 1998).  Indeed,
econometric analysis shows that there were relatively few cases of Czech industrial spin-offs, and they performed
substantially worse than their former parent firms.  (Kotrba, 1994; Lizal, Singer, and Svejnar,1994)
46 See, for instance, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Cui (1995), Ostrom (1990), and Bates (1988).
47 See especially, Bates (1988), Ostrom, (1995), Putnam et al. (1993).  Indeed much of the management literature on
networks came from those working on strategic alliances.  See Larson (1992), Uzzi (1996), Kale, Singh, Permutter
(2000), and Kogut and Zander (1992).
48 Note that even though there was considerable downsizing in the industry, new start-ups would still be hindered by
the depression of the industry.  Start-ups would have, for instance, few chances to buy or lease equipment and obtain
sales.
49 See Coffee (1999) for an insightful argument about why the issue of law in practice and regulatory regimes may
be the crucial issue for capital market development in East-Central Europe.
50 I am speaking here mainly of Article 19 of the 1981 Law on State enterprises and to a lesser degree the amended
1934 Bankruptcy Act.
51 See Blaszczyk and Woodward (1999) and Nuti (1999) for data on privatization.  As of December 1990, there
were 8441 state enterprise.  By December of 1996, 5592 enterprises had entered a track of ownership
transformation.  By this date 662 of these firms had entered the process of the Bankruptcy act.
52 See Gray and Holle (1998a) and Blaszczyk (2000).  I also confirmed this estimate with the research team at
CASE Foundation, Warsaw.
53 See Jarosz (1999), Nuti (1999), and Blaszczyk and Woodward (1999) for details.
54 Sales could be sold for cash or as an in-kind contribution to an existing company.  Alternatively, the assets could
be leased with an option to buy to a company established by at least 50% of the employees of the original firm.
55 This figure is generated from total non-bank privatization revenues through the direct and indirect paths of
privatization.  See Jarosz, p. 35, Table 4 (1999).
56 By the end of 1995, leased firms accounted for over 170 thousand employees, whereas firms in indirect
privatization accounted for about 158 thousand employees.
57 There were two major systematic studies of 200 of these firms (across industries and regions) in 1995 and 1998
(Jarosz, 1996, 1999). One drawback has been the slow rate of investment, largely due to the lack of immediate
ownership of the assets.
58 See Dornisch (1997).56
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59 See Jarosz (1999, Chapters 2, 4, 10), Dornisch (1992, 1999) and Hausner, Kudlacz, and Szlachta (1995, 1997,
1998).
60 See Van Wijnbergen (1997), Gray and Holle (1998b); Dornisch (1997, 2000); Montes-Negret and Papi (1996).  I
draw on these works for the following paragraphs as well.
61 See Coffee (1999); Pistor (1999); and Johnson and Schleifer (1999).
62 See OECD (1996b), Hausner et al (1995, 1998),  Baldersheim, Illner, Offerdal, Rose, and Swianiewicz (1996),
Blazek (1993), Levitas (1999). The basic structural differences are stark.  For instance, the number of Czech
municipalities grew by 50% by 1991 to 6237 with an average size of 1700 inhabitants, while Polish gminas
maintained most of there integrity (2466 gminas with average size of 15, 000 inhabitants).  While Czech and Polish
municipalities have similar, proportional financial data, the Polish gminas were given significantly more autonomy
on the use of funds and organizational resources to pursue, i.e., investment, infrastructure, regional development,
etc.  For analyses of Regional Development Agencies in the region, see Halkier, Danson, and Damborg (1998).
63 On these issues, see OECD (1996b), Hausner et al. (1995, 1997, 1998), Dornisch (1997, 1999, 2000), and Jarosz
(1999).
64 For instance, voivods are essential an arm of the central government, which appoints the governor, controls its
budget, and restricts autonomy in teh use of funds.  (See Hausner et al. (1995, 1997) , Levitas (1999), OECD
(1996b), and Dornisch (1999, 2000).
65 For the following discussion, see Hausner et al. (1995, 1997),  and Dornsich (1997, 1999).THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
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